Large-scale Privatization via Auctions
The case of land in transforming economies
Successful large-scale privatization programs for highly political resources such as land require the consideration not only of economic but also of ethical aspects. On the basis of a game-theoretic framework of analysis, Jocelyn Braun shows that the mechanism of auctioning is an efficient and equitable alternative to many privatization methods that have so far been implemented with disappointing results. The author presents a solution concept and - using Bayesian mechanism design - expands the current theoretical and practice-oriented literature in the light of transformation.
juillet 1998, env. 192 pages, Kasseler Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungswissenschaften, Bd. 7, Allemand
Deutscher Universitätsverlag
978-3-8244-6777-8
Deutscher Universitätsverlag
978-3-8244-6777-8