This textbook offers a distinctive and accessible approach to the economics of uncertainty by placing risk-sharing at the core of the analysis. Rather than relying on the standard principal-agent or mechanism-design framework, it develops a unified perspective that interprets insurance, incentives, and financial arrangements as variations on the possibilities and limits of sharing risk under information frictions.
A key strength of the book is its focus on environments in which all agents are exposed to risk. By moving beyond the common assumption of a risk-neutral principal with deep pockets, it provides a more realistic and broadly applicable framework for analysing moral hazard, adverse selection, signalling, and banking models. This perspective enables readers to understand asymmetric information not merely as a contracting problem, but as a constraint on socially valuable risk-sharing arrangements.
The exposition combines rigour with accessibility. Formal models are presented with propositions, proofs, and exercises, while requiring only intermediate microeconomics, basic calculus, and elementary probability. This makes the book ideally suited for advanced undergraduate and master’s courses, as well as for readers seeking a clear and coherent introduction to modern information economics.
Springer International Publishing
978-3-032-42076-3