Value Capture in Disintegrated Value Chains

Using cooperative game theory, this book shows how bargaining structure affects the distribution of value among the constituent firms of the value chain. Results show that positions in the bargaining structure most conducive to value capture are those where large complementarity gains are realized and split, ideally, among a small number of negotiators. Further, leveraging case studies from the aviation and home appliance industries the author suggests that the bargaining structure can be shaped through by architecture of the value chain and, in turn, through the architecture of the product, and the action of powerful firms to optimize value capture.ContentsDeterminants of value captureBargaining structureModeling the effect of bargaining structure on value captureDrivers of bargaining structure and empirical implications of the hierarchy strategyTarget GroupsResearchers and students in the fields of technology management, innovation management, strategic business management, and supply chain managementManagers and practitioners in the fields of business strategy, procurement, and supply chain managementThe AuthorAlexander Hoffmann is a researcher in the field of technology and innovation management at the TU München, Germany, and a management consultant.The EditorsThe series Innovation und Entrepreneurship is edited by Prof. Dr. Nikolaus Franke, Prof. Dietmar Harhoff, Ph.D., Prof. Dr. Joachim Henkel, and Prof. Dr. Carolin Häußler.