Rechtsschutz der Aktionäre der Zielgesellschaft bei unterlassenem Pflichtangebot nach § 35 WpÜG

'Legal Protection for Shareholders of the Target Company in the Absence of a Mandatory Takeover Offer under Section 35 German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG)': According to prevailing opinion, shareholders have no remedies in the case of failure to make a mandatory takeover offer under sec. 35 of the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (WpÜG), as the WpÜG is not considered to serve the purpose of individual protection. However, the WpÜG implements the EU Takeover Directive and must be interpreted in light of ECJ case law, which aims to empower EU citizens to enforce their rights (functional subjectivisation). The conclusion of this treatise, therefore, deviates from the prevailing opinion, asserting that the subjectivisation of the mandatory takeover offer regulation is required under EU law.