Das neue Finanzkapital

Did the ECB pursue monetary policy or a policy of rescuing the euro? Did it at least attempt to fulfil its primary mandate of maintaining price stability? Or did it misuse its powers for a collateral policy aimed at providing liquidity to banks and rescuing heavily indebted states through the printing press, even though Articles 123 TFEU (prohibition of monetary financing) and 125 TFEU (no-bailout clause) explicitly prohibit such actions? Did it function as a bailout machine by acquiring sovereign debt securities that were channelled to it indirectly through commercial banks? Did it artificially lower interest rates for distressed countries that financial markets no longer considered creditworthy, thereby encouraging them to accumulate even more debt and further violate fiscal debt limits?
These are the central questions addressed in this book, which offers answers grounded in both legal and economic analysis. Markus C. Kerber extends his examination beyond these issues to the largely unaccountable governance that emerged through the creation of the various euro rescue funds-a new form of financial power within the European Union. He argues that this development has fostered a collectivisation of liability while suppressing market forces. In his view, it eliminates risk premiums in interest rates, which in a market economy perform the crucial function of steering capital away from excessively risky activities and allocating it efficiently among competing countries and sectors.