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Inhalt
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
Bibliografische Angaben
November 2012, 154 Seiten, Studies in Choice and Welfare, Englisch
Springer Nature EN
978-3-642-26505-1
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Schlagworte
Inhalt
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
Bibliografische Angaben
November 2012, 154 Seiten, Studies in Choice and Welfare, Englisch
Springer Nature EN
978-3-642-26505-1