Sovereign Debt Crises and Negotiations in Brazil and Mexico, 1888-1914
Governments versus Bankers
Von:
Leonardo Weller| Addresses the pre-1914 sovereign debt market from both creditors' and borrowing governments' perspectives<div><br/></div><div>Presents new primary documents that bolster opinions of Brazil and Mexican government negotiation effectiveness</div><div><br/></div><div>Proposes a new analytical framework to conceptualize how factors determined the relative power between governments and creditors</div> |
<div>This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation. </div>
April 2018, Englisch
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
9783319736334
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
9783319736334