Revenue-Raising Institutions, State Organization and Economic Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire

This book offers an innovative look at the Ottoman iltizam (tax-farming) system through the lens of historical inquiry and modern theory.   Drawing from original archival research as well as theoretical frameworks such as principal-agent theory and game theory, this book explores how the Ottoman state managed revenue collection, delegated authority, and grappled with institutional constraints. The chapters guide readers through the evolution of tax farming from its historical roots and theoretical foundations to detailed case studies. Contributors examine fiscal capacity, state-building, credible commitment, and the unintended consequences of decentralization. The final chapters explore 19th-century constitutional reforms that changed the institutional designs of earlier periods and synthesize key findings. Essential for scholars of Ottoman history, economic history, political economy, and institutional change, this volume redefines how we understand state organization, economic transformation, and governance in non-Western contexts.     Bora Altay  is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics, Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Türkiye. His research focuses on the long-term development and economic performance of societies. He mostly concentrates on the tools of new institutional economics and gives particular attention to the Ottoman Empire and its institutions. In addition to research articles focused on Ottoman institutions, Dr. Altay is the author of the book  Rules, Contracts, and Law Enforcement in the Ottoman Empire: The Case of Tax-Farming Contracts  and a co-editor of the book  Islamic Financial Institutions from the Early Modern Period to the 20th Century: Comparative Perspectives on the History and Development of Cash Waqfs , both published by Palgrave Macmillan.