Us Diplomacy and the Good Friday Agreement in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland

This book provides an essential revision of the post-1998 period in Northern Ireland and the significance of US involvement in the region. The George W. Bush administration's intervention from 2001 to 2007 was decisive and remains undervalued and misunderstood. Throughout this time the State Department managed American intercession with responsibility for strategy falling to two special envoys: Richard Haass and Mitchell Reiss.

The Good Friday Agreement was one of the twentieth century's least expected peace settlements. The accord, however, did not deliver immediate stability to Northern Ireland. The institutions of the agreement lay paralysed within a few short years and the country was in fragile and deeply entrenched ethno-nationalist stalemate. This book pioneers a new scholarly approach to this period. It combines a rigorous analysis of the contemporary development of the State Department and Policy Planning Staff, the context of US foreign policy between 2001 and 2007, and the political roller-coaster that was Northern Ireland post-1998. Fascinating insights from important political and diplomatic actors are provided, many of whom offer accounts that hitherto have not been heard. It will also be shown how State Department-led intervention in Northern Ireland strained the "special relationship" even as it enjoyed a resurgence under George W. Bush and Tony Blair. This is a fascinating and unreported occurrence in the history of post-conflict Northern Ireland.

In May 2007 the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement were restored. This book reveals how this would not have happened without the strategic interventions by two State Department diplomats.