Rechtssubjektivität für Künstliche Intelligenz

Jessica Hawighorst's study investigates whether and under what conditions artificial intelligence can be recognized as an independent legal subject. Focusing on the concept of the "electronic person" (ePerson), it examines the theoretical and doctrinal foundations of assigning legal personality to autonomous AI systems. The author combines systematic legal analysis with philosophical and constitutional reasoning, drawing on both German and European contexts, including the AI Act. The author discusses how the growing autonomy of AI systems raises questions of foreseeability, traceability, and responsibility for their actions. Central legal concepts such as "person," "subject," and "capacity" are critically reassessed, showing that legal subjectivity is a legislative construct within constitutional limits rather than an inherent property. Ethical and cultural considerations serve as guiding principles for determining the scope of potential AI personhood. The study concludes that while granting AI legal personhood is theoretically feasible and could clarify certain issues in contract and liability law, it is not currently necessary. Establishing such a framework would require significant legislative effort. The decision thus remains a matter of political and normative choice.